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Abstract
This Article will deal with the rights of European Union (“EU”) citizens and third country
nationals. It first gives a brief overview of the classical doctrine of harmonization of legislation.
This is followed by an analysis of the harmonization issues for rights of EU citizens (Part II) and
third country nationals (Part III). Subsequently, harmonization methods are discussed (Part IV).
Finally, it will attempt to sketch a framework for analysis (Part V).
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INTRODUCTION
It is with great pleasure that we dedicate this contribution to
Francis Jacobs. As Advocate General, Francis Jacobs has made
numerous important contributions to the development of Euro-
pean Community ("EC" or "Community") law. These will un-
doubtedly be highlighted in the other contributions written in
his honor. This Article will deal with the rights of European
Union ("EU") citizens and third country nationals. In his opin-
ion in Konstantinidis1 FrancisJacobs reminded us of the universal
rights of Roman citizens and suggested that a similar status
should be attributed to EU citizens. It seems that we in the EU
have come a long way towards such a status. Recently, the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the EU adopted three important harmoniza-
tion measures on the free movement of persons. The first was
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of
the Member States. 2 This Directive replaced the existing patch-
work of rules on the rights of migrating EU citizens and codified
case law of the European Court of Justice (the "Court" or
"ECJ") .3 The second was Directive 2003/109 concerning the sta-
* PietJan Slot is a professor at the Europa Institute of Leiden University. Mielle
Bulterman is senior lecturer at the same institute. This is a translated and updated
version of their earlier article entitled, "Harmonisatie van wetgeving betreffende migrerende
EU-burgers en derdelanders: op weg naar een uniform toetsingskader." The authors wish to
thank Pieter Boeles, Kamiel Mortelmans, and their colleagues at the Leiden Europe
Institute for their useful comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw-Ordnung-
samt, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1191.
2. See generally Council Directive No. 2004/38, O.J. L 158/77 (2004). Apparently,
it was quite difficult to have the correct version of this directive published in the Official
Journal. It was first published in O.J. L 158/77 (2004) as Directive 2004/58. In O.J. L
229/35 (2004) a first corrigendum was published, but the mistake in the numbering of
the directive was not corrected. This only happened in the corrigendum to the corri-
gendum published in O.J. L 197/34 (2005).
3. See id. art. 5, 1 4 (implementing the judgment in Mouvement contre le racisme,
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tus of third country nationals who are long-term residents, 4 and
the third was Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunifica-
tion.
As in other areas of Community law, there is tension be-
tween the need for harmonized rules and the pursuit of objec-
tives of the individual Member States. A uniform framework of
rules is not always possible or desirable, as Member States must
have some latitude to chart their own course. Therefore, an
ever-recurring question in case of harmonization of legislation is
to what extent national Member States could maintain or intro-
duce national measures if harmonization measures have been
adopted. Could the Netherlands allow family reunification
rights to homosexual partners of third country nationals who are
residing in the Netherlands? And if so, the question arises
whether such rights should be recognized by the other Member
States.
For the internal market a clear doctrine on the harmoniza-
tion of legislation has been developed largely due to the relevant
case law of the ECJ. This doctrine indicates when national mea-
sures may go beyond the standard contained in the relevant di-
rective.' In the case of the harmonization of the rights of EU
citizens and third country nationals, however, the applicable
rules are less clearly defined and still under development.
This Article will make an attempt to outline some principles
for a framework of harmonization of the rights of migrating EU
citizens and third country nationals. We will ask whether the
general rules on the harmonization of legislation as developed
by the ECJ over the years apply to the area of the harmonization
of "migration rights" and if so, to what extent. The harmoniza-
tion of the rights of migrating EU citizens will be analyzed from
the perspective of Article 18 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community ("EC Treaty") as developed in the Court's re-
l'antisfnitisme et la xenophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. Belgium, Case C-459/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-
6591, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 25); see also id. at pmbl. 27 (briefly referencing Calfa, Case C-
348/96, [1999] E.C.R. 1-11, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 1138).
4. See generally Council Directive No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44 (2004). This Direc-
tive was adopted pursuant to Title IV of the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity ("EC Treaty").
5. See generally Council Directive No. 2003/86, OJ. L 251/12 (2003).
6. See generally Piet Jan Slot, Harmonisation, 21 EUR. L. REv. 378 (1996).
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cent case law.7 For third country nationals for whom the rules
applicable to EU citizens do not apply because they have no rela-
tionship with an EU citizen,' the rules for harmonization have
yet to be developed.
This Article first gives a brief overview of the classical doc-
trine of harmonization of legislation. This is followed by an anal-
ysis of the harmonization issues for rights of EU citizens (Part II)
and third country nationals (Part III). Subsequently, harmoniza-
tion methods are discussed (Part IV). Finally we will attempt to
sketch a framework for analysis (Part V).
For the sake of completeness it should be noted that Article
65,' in conjunction with Article 61 (c) 0 of Title IV of the EC
Treaty also requires harmonization measures in other areas.
These areas are often closely connected with the internal mar-
ket. In such cases, the framework of the free movement rules
could serve to delimit the powers of the Member States and the
Community." t Not everyone, however, is convinced of the need
for such harmonization.' 2 In the case of harmonization of fam-
ily law, national measures would have to be judged by the provi-
sions of the European Convention on Human Rights, and possi-
bly Article 18 of the EC Treaty as well.
I. HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION
For a long time harmonization has been used in the Euro-
pean Community primarily as a tool to realize the internal mar-
7. See Consolidated Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 18, OJ. C
325/33, at 45 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
8. See generally Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Akrich, Case C(-109/01, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-9607, [2003] 3 C.M.L.R. 26. As Akrich demonstrates, it is not always easy to
determine whether the rules of EC law protecting relatives of EU citizens can be relied
upon when the third country national concerned is residing unlawfully in a Member
State. See generally Eleanor Spaventa, Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment v. H. Akrich, judgment of the Full Court of 23 September 2003, [2003] ECR 1-9607, 42
COMMON MKT. L. Rv. 225 (2005).
9. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 65, O.J. C 325/33, at 59-60 (2002).
10. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 61, O.J. C 325/33, at 57-58 (2002).
11. See Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, [1999] E.C.R.
1-1459, 1472, 16, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 583. See generally Uberseering BV v. Nordic
Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), Case C-208/00, [2002] E.C.R.
1-9919, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 1; Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., Case C-167/01, [2003] E.C.R 1-10155, [2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 34.
12. See generally ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN BRUSSELS I AND ROME I (Johan
Meeusen et al. eds., 2004).
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ket's objectives, especially the free movement of goods. In that
context also, extensive case law has evolved to clearly define the
powers of the Member States and the Community. Moreover,
the various amendments to the EC Treaty have created new pro-
visions that further clarified these relations. This applies in par-
ticular to EC Treaty Article 95, paragraphs 4 to 10.13 It could be
argued that the interaction between the judiciary and the legisla-
ture in the highest instance has resulted in a well-defined doc-
trine.
In the Tedeschi judgment, the ECJ held that if a certain sub-
ject matter is covered exhaustively by a directive, the compatibil-
ity with EC law of measures of Member States have to be assessed
on the basis of the directive and the general provisions on free
movement in the EC Treaty can no longer be invoked. 14 In that
case, national laws that derogate from the standards laid down in
the directive in question are allowed, if."
a) The relevant directive provides for minimum harmoniza-
tion;1
6
b) The directive contains a safeguard clause that permits der-
ogation from the directive's regime. The safeguard clause
sets the conditions for the adoption of safeguard mea-
sures by the Member States;
c) The national measure complies with the terms and condi-
tions of Article 95(4) or (5) of the EC Treaty.
It is important to note that national measures taken under a) or
b) should be in conformity with the rules of the Treaty. That
means that if such measures restrict the free movement of
13. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 95, O.J. C 325/33, at 69.70 (2002).
14. See Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale s.r.l., Case 5/77, [1977] E.C.R. at 1577.
15. National rules beyond the scope of the directive should conform to the rules of
Articles 28 through 30 of the EC Treaty if they concern the free movement of goods. In
other words, the (lower) limit of the rules set by the Treaty and case law revives in such
a case. In the measures under b) (the directive contains a safeguard clause), the evalua-
tion is performed by the Commission. In cases arising under a) (the relevant directive
provides for minimum harmonization), it is further relevant whether the directive has a
free movement clause. In such a case, the evaluation framework of Articles 28 through
30 EC is of secondary importance.
16. Besides minimum harmonization, the literature distinguishes the following
forms of harmonization: total harmonization (a uniform standard is laid down); op-
tional harmonization (market parties have a choice); partial harmonization (a uniform
standard applies to intra-Community movement, but Member States may deviate from
that standard for internal situations); and alternative harmonization (in which Member
States have a choice with regard to the standard to be implemented). In practice, mini-
mum harmonization and total harmonization are the most common methods.
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goods, they are permitted only if justified on the basis of Article
30 of the EC Treaty or the rule of reason as pointed out by the
ECJ in DocMorris'7 and Commission v. Germany.1 8
In the event of minimum harmonization the directive could
provide for a so-called free movement clause. This clause im-
plies that possibly stricter requirements of one of the Member
States may not be applied to products from other Member States
that satisfy the directive's minimum standard.
The above framework also applies to products from third
countries. Article 23 EC stipulates that the treaty provisions on
the free movement of goods also extend to "products coming
from third countries which are in free circulation in Member
States."' 9 Article 95 EC applies to EU products as well as to prod-
ucts from third countries that are in free circulation. The
Court's case law further shows that harmonization measures
based on Article 95 EC can relate to products to be exported to
third countries. 20
The doctrine and case law have not explicitly considered
the extent to which derogations contained in paragraphs 421 and
17. Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval,
Case C-322/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-14887. This case concerned a situation like the one
under section b. In paragraphs 64 and 65 of the judgment, the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ") held:
A national measure in a sphere which has been the subject of exhaustive
harmonisation at Community level must be assessed in the light of the provi-
sions of the harmonising measure and not those of the Treaty .... However,
the power conferred on Member States by Article 14(1) of Directive 97/7
must be exercised with due regard for the Treaty, as is expressly stated in that
provision,
Such a provision does not, therefore, obviate the need to ascertain
whether the national prohibition at issue in the main proceedings is compati-
ble with Articles 28 EC to 30 EC.
See id. 64-65. Even if the relevant Directive does not say so, the Member States should
exercise their powers under the Directive in conformity with the Treaty provisions. See,
e.g., Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financirn, Case C-168/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-
9409.
18. Commission v. Germany, Case C-463/01, [2004] ECR 1-11705 (regarding de-
posits on bottled mineral water). This was a situation in which the issue was not regu-
lated exhaustively. In this judgment the ECJ ruled in paragraph 44 that the Directive
did not embody exhaustive regulation of rules about reusage. The ECJ, incidentally,
used the term "complete harmonization."
19. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 23, O.J. C 325/33, at 46 (2002).
20. See, e.g., British American Tobacco Manufacturing BV v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld,
Case C-222/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-4683.
21. Article 95, paragraph 4 reads:
If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation
752 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:747
522 of Article 95 EC could be invoked in the event of harmoniza-
tion measures that are not based on Article 95 EC. The wording
of Article 95 EC does not seem to exclude such interpretation;
paragraphs 4 and 5 after all refer to "a harmonisation measure"
in general. On the other hand, paragraph 1 of Article 95 EC
stipulates that the provisions contained in Article 95 apply "save
where otherwise provided in this Treaty."23 That may seem to
imply that paragraphs 4 and 5 do not apply to harmonization
measures that are not based on Article 95.
II. RULES CONCERNING EU CITIZENS
A. Introduction
Important to EU citizens first and foremost, are naturally
the economic freedoms of the EC Treaty (Articles 39, 43, and
49) .24 Over the years the significance of these provisions has be-
come clear from the ECJ's case law. Furthermore, directives
have been adopted to implement the Treaty freedoms. First,
there are the rules implementing the rights of travel and resi-
dence guaranteed to EU citizens by the EC Treaty. Second, har-
monization has taken place concerning national rules that do
not relate directly to the rights of travel and residence, but may
restrict the free movement of person (for instance, diploma re-
quirements and driver's license requirements). Examples of the
first category are Directive 68/360 on the abolition of restric-
tions on movement and residence within the Community for
workers of Member States and their families25 and Directive 64/
measure, a Member State deems it necessary to maintain national provisions
on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protec-
tion of the environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Com-
mission of these provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them.
EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 95(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 69 (2002).
22. Article 95, paragraph 5 reads:
Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the
Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State
deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific
evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working envi-
ronment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising after
the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of
the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them.
Id. art. 95(5), O.J. C 325/33, at 69 (2002).
23. See id. art. 95, O.J. C 325/33, at 69, 1 (2002).
24. See id. arts. 39, 43, 49, O.J. C 325/33, at 51, 52, 54, (2002).
25. See Council Directive No. 68/360, O.J. L 257/13 (1968).
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221 on the coordination of special measures concerning the
movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 6
The new Directive 2004/38 also comes in this category. 27 This
Directive puts an end to the existing patchwork of rules of the
right to move and reside freely for each category of economically
active EU citizens (employees, the self-employed, and students).
Directive 2004/38 relates to the conditions for exercising the
right of EU citizens and their family members to move and re-
side freely, and restrictions on said rights for reasons of public
policy, public security, or public health.28
Originally, economically inactive EU citizens could not rely
upon the EC Treaty to invoke their right to move freely. This
changed with the adoption of Article 18 of the EC Treaty intro-
ducing a general right of travel and residence for EU citizens. It
took some time before the scope of Article 18(1) EC was defined
by the ECJ. The question was what the surplus value of this pro-
vision was, compared to the other free movement provisions and
the relevant secondary legislation. 29 ECJ case law now allows
some conclusions about the relationship between Article 18 of
the EC Treaty and secondary legislation on the travel and resi-
dence rights of EU subjects.
B. Granting of Nationality
A first conclusion is that Article 18 does not require the har-
monization of national laws on the granting of nationality. EU
citizenship follows from the nationality of a Member State and
the Member States remain exclusively competent to confer na-
tionality. This was confirmed in Chen.3" A girl born to Chinese
parents was granted Irish nationality on account of her being
born in North Ireland. The girl's birth in North Ireland had
been, as the mother admitted, carefully planned to take advan-
26. See Council Directive No. 64/221, O.J. L 56/850 (1964).
27. See Council Directive No. 2004/38, O.J. L 158/77, at 84 (2004).
28. For a general discussion of the contents of Directive 2004/38, see Kay Hail-
bronner, Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1245
(2005).
29. For a discussion on this issue in the early days of EU citizenship, see SIOFRA
O'LEARY, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP: FROM FREE MOVEMENT
OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZENSHIP (1996).
30. Chen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
9925, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 48. See also Kaur, Case C-192/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1237.
2006]
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tage of EU citizenship. When mother and daughter, relying on
Article 18 of the EC Treaty, claimed the right to reside in the
United Kingdom, the U.K. Government argued that Chen's
daughter should not be regarded as an EU citizen. The ECJ set
this argument aside and concluded that, by virtue of Irish law,
Chen had Irish nationality and other Member States could not
challenge that.
C. Article 18(1) and the Right of Residence
The ECJ's case law has a major impact on the right of resi-
dence of economically inactive EU citizens. Economically active
EU citizens derive their right of residence directly from the
Treaty provisions. Economically inactive EU citizens must rely
on Directives 90/364,1 90/36532 and 93/963s (collectively, the
"residence Directives"). The case law of the ECJ shows that the
specific criteria for granting residence rights laid down in these
Directives should be applied with due regard to the European
citizenship requirements.
Grzelczyk 34 concerned the question whether the French stu-
dent Grzelczyk was entitled to claim Minimex (a social benefit)
in Belgium. Although his residence status was not the subject of
the dispute, the ECJ's answer to the question about Mr.
Grzelczyk's right to Minimex did affect his resident status in
Belgium directly. In its decision, the ECJ ruled that the resi-
dence criteria laid down in Directive 93/96 (the "Students' Di-
rective") had to be interpreted restrictively. Thus, the require-
ment that students should have adequate means of subsistence
applied at the moment the student commenced his studies. The
ECJ also ruled that the exclusion of grants in Article 3 of Direc-
tive 93/96 did not mean that the Directive entails that students
may not have access to social benefits. This approach appears to
be based on the provisions of the Students' Directive itself, and a
comparison with the other two residence Directives. In Grzelczyk,
31. Council Directive No. 90/364, O.J. L 180/26 (1990) (on the right of resi-
dence).
32. Council Directive No. 90/365, O.J. L 180/28 (1990) (on the right of residence
for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity).
33. Council Directive No. 93/96, O.J. L 317/59 (1993) (on the right of residence
for students).
34. Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Case C-
184/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6193, [2002].
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the ECJ refers to two important basic principles that underlie
these Directives: beneficiaries may not become "an unreasona-
ble burden" on the host State's public finances.35 There is, how-
ever, a "certain degree of financial solidarity" between the sub-
jects of the host State and those of other Member States. 6 All
the more so when the problems of the beneficiary of a right of
residence are merely temporary, as with Mr. Grzelczyk, who
called on public finances in the last year of his study only when
he could no longer combine his academic commitments with a
job.
Baumbast,37 even more so than Grzelczyk, demonstrates the
relevance of Article 18 EC to the limitations and conditions set
out in the residence Directives. Under Article 18, these limita-
tions and conditions are subject to judicial review by the ECJ.
Therefore, they must be applied in accordance with the limits
imposed by Community law, including the general principles of
that law, in particular the principle of proportionality. In
Baumbast the ECJ again noted that the residence Directives em-
body the principle that beneficiaries may not become an unrea-
sonable burden on the host Member State's public finances.3"
Specifically, the Court ruled that it is not proportionate for a
Member State to refuse an EU subject the right of residence sim-
ply because he is not insured for urgent medical assistance, pro-
vided he does satisfy the other criteria of Directive 90/364."9
The decision in Trojani showed that the right of residence
under Article 18 EC does have its limits.4 ° An EU citizen who
does not have adequate resources as referred to in Directive 90/
364 cannot rely on Article 18 to reside in the territory of a Mem-
ber State of which he is not a subject. In such a case, the refusal
of a right of residence is not disproportionate to attain the Direc-
tive's objective. The ECJ's case law does not-at least not to date-
-result in total equal treatment of economically active and eco-
35. Id. 44; see also Michael Dougan, Fees, Grants, Loans and Dole Cheques: Who
Covers the Cost of Migrant Education Within the EU, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 943 (2005).
36. Grzelczyk, [2001] E.C.R. at 1-6245, 44.
37. Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-413/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-
7091, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 23.
38. See id. at 1-7167, 90.
39. See id. at 1-7168, 1 93.
40. See Trojani v. Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS), Case C-456/
02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-7573, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 38.
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nomically inactive EU citizens. As Advocate General Leger ob-
served in his opinion in Oulane:
The development of Community law undeniably leans to-
wards uniformization, yes unity even, of the applicable regula-
tions on the free movement of subjects of Member States. In
anticipation of such uniformization, and for the issues that
are still governed by sectoral Community regulations, I be-
lieve that the classification of beneficiaries of free movement
still has a legal purpose.41
As we will see in Part III of this Article, the rights of travel and
residence have been specifically addressed in Directive 2004/38.
D. Article 18(1) and Equal Treatment
Equal treatment is a fundamental right for EU citizens.
This right is enshrined in the Treaty provisions on the internal
market. In addition, there is the general prohibition of discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality of Article 12 EC. The general
rule of Article 12 applies if the specific prohibitions of the free
movement provisions are not applicable. The prohibition of Ar-
ticle 12 applies only to situations that come within the scope of
Community law. This implies a double check: EC law should
apply ratione personae and ratione materiae.42 Article 24 of Direc-
tive 2004/38 contains a very general equal treatment clause:
Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided
for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens resid-
ing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host
Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals
of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The
benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who
are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right
of residence or permanent residence.43
Meanwhile, the ECJ ruled in Bidar that this specific provision in
the Directive cannot affect the right to equal treatment derived
41. Opinion of Advocate General Leger, Oulane v. Minister voor Vreemdel-
ingenzaken en integratie, Case C-215/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-1215, 49.
42. Ratione personae means "by reason of the person concerned," and ratione mater-
iae means "by reason of the matter involved." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (7th ed.
1999).
43. Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 24, O.J. L 158/77, at 112 (2004).
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by EU citizens from the EC Treaty.44 Thus, individuals can rely
on Article 12 EC in cases outside the scope of Article 24 of the
Directive, primarily those cases in which an EU citizen derives a
right of residence from national law. The non-discrimination
provision contained in Directive 2004/38 is discussed in further
detail below.
1. The Scope Ratione Personae of EC Law for Economically
Inactive Citizens
Until the introduction of EU citizenship, economically inac-
tive citizens derived their residence rights solely from those Di-
rectives that defined the scope ratione personae of Community
law. The introduction of Article 18 EC has changed this. It fol-
lows from the ECJ's case law that EU subjects who lawfully reside
in another Member State fall within the scope ratione personae of
Article 18 and for this reason can rely on Article 12 EC. The
application of Article 12 does not require the EU citizen in ques-
tion to have a right of residence based on EC law. In Trojani, the
ECJ considered that a lawful residence based on national legisla-
tion suffices to bring a community national within the scope ra-
tione personae of Community law and to trigger Article 12." The
ECJ based this conclusion on three arguments: the social secur-
ity payment (Minimex) comes within the scope of the Treaty;
Mr. Trojani lawfully resides in the host Member State for a spe-
cific period; and Mr. Trojani meets the requirements applicable
to the host Member State's own subjects for the social security
payment. Other EU citizens satisfying the same conditions are
likely to benefit from this ruling. Fulfilling these conditions may
be helped by the fact that it is often difficult for the authorities
of the Member States to establish whether residence is illegal.
Because of the absence of border checks, every EU citizen can
enter freely. Consequently, after residing a specific period in a
Member State, their EU citizenship almost automatically creates
a right to equal treatment.
The ruling in Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskiniinen Vakuutusyh-
44. See generally Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R.
1-2119, [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 3.
45. See Trojani, [2004] E.C.R. at 844, 40. This was already pleaded by Advocate
General Geelhoed in Ninni-Orasche, but in that judgment, the ECJ only considered Arti-
cle 39 of the EC Treaty. See Ninni-Orasche v. Bundesminister Ffr Wissenschaft, Verkehr
und Kunst, Case C-413/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-13187.
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ti demonstrates that the right to equal treatment can also be
invoked in the event of unequal treatment in the country of ori-
gin.46 Pusa left Finland and took up residence in Spain. Accord-
ing to the ECJ, Article 18(1) and Article 12 of the EC Treaty
protected him against the discriminatory taxes imposed by the
Finnish tax authorities.47
The scope ratione personae of Article 18 EC does have its lim-
its. Purely internal situations do not come within the scope of
EC law. In Uecker &Jacquet, the ECJ made clear that the provi-
sions on citizenship do not alter this situation: citizenship of the
Union as provided for by Article 17 EC does not extend the
scope ratione materiae of the Treaty to include purely internal sit-
uations.48 By contrast, Garcia Avello came within the scope of
Community law because the children involved had the national-
ity of two Member States and had resided in one of those Mem-
ber States since birth.4" And in Schempp, the ECJ held that Arti-
cle 18 and Article 12 EC could be relied upon by a German na-
tional paying alimony to a former wife who resided in Austria.5"
Another interesting case on the scope of Article 18 EC is
Baldinger.5 The facts of the case are as follows: Under the Aus-
trian Kriegsgefangenenentschddigungsgesetz (Act on the compensa-
tion of war prisoners, or "KGEG"), Austrian citizens who were
held prisoners of war during the First or Second World War
qualify for compensation from the Austrian State. According to
the Austrian national court, applicants were required to have
Austrian nationality at the time of application. As a result, Mr.
Baldinger did not qualify for compensation. An Austrian by
46. Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskindinen Vakuutusyht6, Case C-224/02, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-5763, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 23.
47. See id. at 525-26, 16-17, 20. In Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, how-
ever, the Court of Justice held that a dentist who had never trained or worked outside
his Member State of origin could not rely on Article 43 EC (freedom of establishment)
because of the mere fact that he was residing in a Member State other than his Member
State of origin. See generally Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, Case C-112/91,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-429.
48. See Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker, Joined Cases C-64/96 & C-65/96,
[1997] E.C.R. 1-3171, 1-3190, 1 23, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 963, 976.
49. See Garcia Avello v. Etat Belge, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. 1-11613, [2004] 1
C.M.L.R. 1.
50. See Schempp v. Finanzamt Mfnchen V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-6421,
[2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 37.
51. Baldinger v. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter, Case C-386/02, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-8411, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 20.
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birth, Mr. Baldinger had been a prisoner of war in Russia from
May 1945 to December 1947. After the war, he resided in Aus-
tria for some time and then emigrated to Sweden. In 1967, he
exchanged his Austrian nationality for Swedish nationality. It
was beyond dispute that Mr. Baldinger satisfied the material con-
dition for compensation under the KGEG. The only obstacle
was that he no longer held Austrian nationality at the time of his
application.
The questions submitted by the national court-and the an-
swer provided by the ECJ-all relate to the question of whether
the Austrian rule is incompatible with Article 39 EC. The Court
did not think so, and pointed out that arrangements on compen-
sations to victims of acts of war or their consequences do not
come within the scope of Regulations 1408/71 and 1612/68, or
Article 39(2) EC.5 2 The question of whether the Austrian ar-
rangement was compatible with Article 18 EC was not consid-
ered by the ECJ. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer took
the view that the Austrian nationality requirement should also be
considered from the perspective of Article 18. According to
him, the crucial question would be whether Mr. Baldinger could
invoke Article 18. Obviously, the fact that Mr. Baldinger had
Swedish nationality was insufficient to invoke Article 18. Be-
cause of the fact that Mr. Baldinger was already living in Sweden
as a Swede at the time of Sweden's and Austria's accession to the
Union, he could hardly be regarded as a migrating EU citizen.
But the Advocate General argued that this fact was not decisive:
[W] here the cross-border element consists of the fact that a
person who used to hold the nationality of one Member State
now resides in another Member State.. . his situation cannot
be equated with that of nationals of his host Member State
who have always retained the same nationality. In fact, as
these proceedings demonstrate, despite the passage of time,
his former bond of nationality may still determine his entitle-
ment to certain rights. Clearly, it is not a purely internal mat-
ter.53
52. See id. at 512-13, 11, 16, 19, 20-21.
53. Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Baldinger v. Pensionsver-
sicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter, Case C-386/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-8411, 38.
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2. The Scope Ratione Materiae of EC Law
Even if every EU citizen lawfully residing in another EU
Member State now comes within the scope of the EC Treaty, for
a claim to be brought successfully it should also be assessed
whether the act comes within the scope ratione materiae of Article
12 EC. In the past, for example, the ECJ made clear that study
grants do not come within the scope of EC law.
It appears that the introduction of Article 18 EC has also
resulted in an extension of the scope ratione materiae of EC law.5 4
In Grzelczyk, the ECJ held that a student may invoke Article 12 EC
to gain access to a social benefit in a non-contributory system.55
In Collins, the Court ruled that:
In view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and
the interpretation in the case-law of the right to equal treat-
ment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible
to exclude from the scope of Article 48(2) of the Treaty-
which expresses the fundamental principle of equal treat-
ment, guaranteed by Article 6 of the Treaty-a benefit of a
financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment
in the labour market of a Member State.5 6
Formerly it had been established case-law that persons in search
of employment enjoyed some degree of protection under Article
39 EC, but were entitled only to equal treatment with regard to
the access to employment and not with regard to the social and
fiscal advantages referred to in Article 7, paragraph 2 of Regula-
tion 1612/68. In Commission v. Belgium, the ECJ held that a
national employment program for young persons seeking first
employment does not fall within the scope of EC law.58
The case law (Lair 9 and Brown6") holding that student
54. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Bidar v. London Borough of Eal-
ing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119, [2005] 2 C.M.L.R_ 3. In the opinion, Advo-
cate General Geelhoed reached the same conclusion.
55. See Grzelczyk, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6193, 6249, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 543, 586.
56. Collins v. Sec'y of State for Work and Pensions, Case C-138/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
2703, 63, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 8, 183.
57. See generally Centre Public d'Aide Sociale, Courcelles v. Lebon, Case 316/85,
[1987] E.C.R. 2811, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 337; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-278/94,
[1996] E.C.R. 1-4307, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1040.
58. See Commission v. Belgium, Case C-278/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-4307, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 1040.
59. Lair v. Universitdt Hannover, Case C-39/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, [1989] 3
C.M.L.R. 545.
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grants are beyond the scope of EC law was reviewed in Bidar.6 1
Advocate General Geelhoed argued that developments in Com-
munity law no longer justify the exclusion of the costs of living.
He pointed to the introduction of EU citizenship and the powers
of the European Union in education. The ECJ concurred with
its Advocate General. The ruling in Bidar raises interesting
points about the relationship between the general prohibition of
discrimination under Article 12 EC and secondary legislation.
For instance, the ECJ's view that study grants and loans come
within the scope ratione materiae of EC law is based in part on the
wording of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38.62 This paragraph
allows Member States to deny economically inactive EU citizens
access to study grants and loans. The Court held that this im-
plies that such allowances do come within the scope of Commu-
nity law.63 The ECJ further observed that even though Article 3
of the Students' Directive explicitly excludes study grants and
loans, this provision does not prevent EU citizens lawfully resid-
ing in another Member State pursuant to Article 18 EC and Di-
rective 90/364 from invoking Article 12 EC.64
Like the ECJ's ruling in Bidar, the interpretation of Article
18 EC suggested by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in
Baldinger extends the scope ratione materiae of EC law. The allow-
ance at issue was excluded explicitly from the scope of Regula-
tion 1408/71 as well as from the scope of Article 39 EC. This did
not stop him from concluding that Articles 18 and 12 of the EC
Treaty would entitle Mr. Baldinger to this allowance.
3. Significance of the Right to Equal Treatment
Once it has been established that EU citizens can rely on
Article 12 EC, the question is: What does the right to non-dis-
crimination under Article 12 imply?
First, it prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality,
60. Brown v. Sec'y of State for Scotland, Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, [1988] 3
C.M.L.R. 403.
61. See generally Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Bidar, Case C-209/03,
[2005] E.C.R. 1-2119, [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 3.
62. See Bidar, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119, 1 4243, [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. at 90.
63. See id. 43.
64. See id. 46. In this context, the difference in wording between Article 3 of
Directive 93/96 and Article 24, paragraph 2, of Directive 2004/38 is interesting. In the
former, study grants are explicitly excluded from the Directive's effect, and in the latter,
Member States are given the possibility of excluding these from equal treatment.
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i.e., direct discrimination. Thus the specific Belgian criteria for
subjects from other Member States to qualify for Minimex were
set aside in Grzelczyk and Trojani. Contrary to the prohibition
provisions of the economic freedoms, Article 12 EC does not
contain any exceptions. Nevertheless, the prohibition contained
in Article 12 is not absolute. According to the ECJ, Article 12
entitles EU citizens to equal legal treatment "irrespective of their
nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided
for."6 5 This means that the exceptions contained in the Treaty
that apply to the free movement of persons, such as the public
policy exception, may also be relevant for the application of Arti-
cle 12 (see paragraph 5).
Article 12 goes beyond prohibiting a formal distinction be-
tween a Member State's own subjects and those from other
Member States. The Article also prohibits provisions that dis-
criminate indirectly, i.e. national legislation that does not dis-
criminate explicitly on grounds of nationality but contains crite-
ria that are easier to fulfill by national subjects. An example of
an indirectly discriminatory provision is the British law that was
at issue in Collins.6 6 Under this law, persons seeking employ-
ment who had their habitual place of residence in the UK quali-
fied for an allowance for job seekers. The ECJ reasoned:
The 1996 Regulations introduce a difference in treatment ac-
cording to whether the person involved is habitually resident
in the United Kingdom. Since that requirement is capable of
being met more easily by the State's own nationals, the 1996
Regulations place at a disadvantage Member State nationals
who have exercised their right of movement in order to seek
employment in the territory of another Member State (see, to
this effect, Case C-237/94 O'Flynn [1996] ECR 12617, para-
graph 18, and Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy [20031 ECR
1-721, paragraphs 13 and 14).
A residence requirement of that kind can be justified
only if it is based on objective considerations that are inde-
pendent of the nationality of the persons concerned and pro-
portionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions
(Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR 1-7637, para-
65. See, e.g., Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-
11613, 22-23, [2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 23.
66. See generally Brian Francis Collins v. Sec'y of State for Work and Pensions, Case
C-138/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2703, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 8.
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graph 27).67
The rule formulated by the Court is established case law: a mea-
sure that discriminates indirectly is prohibited unless there is an
objective justification. In Collins the ECJ held that a Member
State may require a genuine link between the applicant for an
allowance and the national employment market. The Court
continued:
However, while a residence requirement is, in principle, ap-
propriate for the purpose of ensuring such a connection, if it
is to be proportionate it cannot go beyond what is necessary
in order to attain that objective. More specifically, its applica-
tion by the national authorities must rest on clear criteria
known in advance and provision must be made for the possi-
bility of a means of redress of a judicial nature. In any event,
if compliance with the requirement demands a period of resi-
dence, the period must not exceed what is necessary in order
for the national authorities to be able to satisfy themselves
that the person concerned is genuinely seeking work in the
employment market of the host Member State.6 8
Earlier, in D'Hoop, the ECJ had already accepted the criterion of
a genuine "link between the applicant for [an] allowance and
the geographical employment market" as a justification for
awarding a tideover allowance to school drop-outs, but the Court
found that the Belgian authorities could not link the grant of
tideover allowances to the condition of having obtained the re-
quired diploma in Belgium.69
In Bidar, the Court ruled on the criteria that Member States
may impose in awarding study grants or loans. According to the
ECJ, Member States may award such assistance only "to students
who have demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the
society of that state. ' 70 Residence and settlement criteria are in
principle appropriate to ensure that the applicant for assistance
meets the integration condition.
E. Conclusion
The case law on Article 18 EC has led to an extension of the
67. Id. at 183, 1 65-66.
68. Id. at 184, 72.
69. See D'Hoop v. Office national de l'emploi, Case C-224/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-
6191, 6225, 38, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 12, 334.
70. Bidar, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119, 57, [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 3, 92.
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personal and material scope of EC law for every EU citizen who
resides lawfully in another Member State. This creates a new
framework for review that has a normative effect on the provi-
sions of the Treaty as well as secondary law and on situations in
which no Community rules apply (e.g., Trojani). This frame-
work for review implies a reversal of the onus of proof, in the
sense that, once Union citizenship has been established, na-
tional restrictive measures are only allowed if there is a justifica-
tion subject to the usual proportionality test. In essence, this
framework does not differ much from a similar framework in the
context of the economic freedoms. As a result of the introduc-
tion of Article 18 and its interpretation by the ECJ, it is rather
easy for citizens of the European Union to come within the
Treaty's scope as referred to in Article 12 EC.
The extension of the protection offered by the combined
effect of Article 18(1) and Article 12 clearly increases the impor-
tance of establishing that a situation comes within the scope of
the Treaty. The introduction of Article 18 seems to have ex-
panded the scope ratione materiae of the EC Treaty. As Advocate
General Geelhoed commented in his Opinion on Bidar with re-
gard to study grants and loans:
Where it is acknowledged that such a benefit comes within
the scope ratione materiae of the EC Treaty for workers and
given the rationale of this finding, it would seem to me artifi-
cial to exclude the same benefit from the scope of the Treaty
for other categories of persons who are now also covered by
the Treaty. The question whether these latter categories of
persons are entitled to such benefits should be distinguished
from the question whether the benefit itself is within the
scope of the Treaty.7 1
The application of Article 12 EC prohibits, of course, requiring
nationality as a criterion for access to certain financial facilities
of a Member State. At the same time it is clear that EU citizens
cannot simply immigrate to another Member State to claim cer-
tain allowances in that State: "no [student grant] tourism. 72
Therefore, the question arises as to which criteria Member States
may impose instead of the prohibited nationality requirements.
71. Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Bidar, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-




For allowances awarded to job seekers, the Court accepts the cri-
terion of a link with the geographical employment market. In
implementing these conditions the Member States must ensure
that the applicable criteria are stringent enough to demonstrate
the link with the employment market, yet not so stringent as to
exclude certain persons from the allowance on unjustified
grounds. In the case of student grants, a "certain degree of inte-
gration into the society of [the host Member] State" is an admis-
sible alternative to nationality requirements.73 It will not be easy
to find suitable criteria to exclude access to social benefits that
are not related to economic activities or a study. In Trojani, the
nationality requirement from the Belgian Minimex was rejected.
Which criteria could the Belgian authorities apply instead with-
out violating EC law and without opening their general social
benefits to all EU citizens? The criterion applied by the Court in
Bidar, i.e. "a certain degree of integration into the society of [the
host Member] State" again seems a suitable criterion, but ques-
tions about the details will remain. 4
Not surprisingly, the ECJ's approach has been criticized. 5
It is remarkable, however, that the Court of Justice's active role
has not been challenged in the process of the drafting of the
Constitution. The wording of Article 1-10 of the Constitution de-
tracts nothing from Article 18 of the EC Treaty in content-spe-
cific terms and thus leaves the case law of the Court of Justice
untouched. In the event of dissatisfaction with this case law the
Convention could of course have formulated restrictions. This is
demonstrated by the precedents set by the Barber Protocol 76 and
the Irish abortion Protocol.7 7 Reference could also be made to
the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004 that
explicitly underline the importance of European citizenship.78
73. Bidar, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119, 57, [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. at 92.
74. Id.
75. See generally Dougan, supra note 35.
76. See Protocol concerning Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, O.J. C 191/68 (1992).
77. See Protocol Annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties
establishing the European Communities, O.J. C 191/94 (1992).
78. See European Council, Conclusions of the Chair, December 16 and 17, 2004,
67-68, available at http://ue.eu.int (European Council, Presidency Conclusions).
However, in an interview at the occasion of assuming the Presidency, the Austrian
Chancellor was very critical of the ECJ's role in education cases. The Chancellor's re-
marks were clearly incited by the ECJ's July 7, 2005 ruling in Commission v. Austria,
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It should be noted, however, that in Directive 2004/38, the
Member States appear to slightly reverse ECJ case law.79 Article
24 paragraph 2 contains several exceptions to the right to equal
treatment.8 ° The Member States, for instance, are not required
to award social assistance to EU citizens and migrants seeking
employment during the first three months of their residence.
The same applies to the award of study grants to EU citizens who
do not have permanent residence permits. The exclusion of
persons seeking employment is clearly an attempt to reverse the
consequences of the Collins judgment. Whether this attempt will
succeed is not automatically clear. The adoption of the power of
Member States to exclude the right to equal treatment with re-
gard to study grants and loans for economically inactive migrants
in Article 24(2) of the Directive did not stop the Court of Justice
in Bidar from declaring Article 12 of the EC Treaty applicable to
such facilities.
Advocate General Geelhoed, too, held that Article 24(2) of
the Directive does not bar the application of Article 18 and Arti-
cle 12 EC."1 In his opinion, these Treaty provisions should guide
the interpretation of Article 24(2):
[In applying this condition, the fundamental rights con-
ferred directly by the EC Treaty on EU citizens must be fully
respected .... I do not consider that this amounts to an un-
dermining of the requirement adopted by the Community
legislature. Rather it is necessary to ensure that this require-
ment is applied in conformity with the fundamental provi-
sions of the EC Treaty.8 2
We concur with the opinion of the Advocate General. The pow-
ers of the Member States to exclude grants provided for by Arti-
cle 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 have to be exercised in accor-
dance with Community law and may therefore be reviewed by
the ECJ.
Case C-147/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5969, [2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 23, that national legislation on
admission to Austrian universities was contrary to Community law.
79. See Council Directive No. 2004/38, O.J. L 158/77 (2004).
80. See id. art. 24.
81. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Bidar, Case C-209/03, [2005]




III. RULES CONCERNING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS
A. Introduction
There is no general Treaty framework for rights of travel
and residence of third country nationals as there is for migrating
EU citizens. Third country nationals cannot (directly) invoke
the treaty provisions on the free movement of persons and the
related rights such as the right to equal treatment. Third coun-
try nationals can, however, invoke the harmonization legislation
promoting the free movement of persons (the second category
mentioned in Part II.A. above). This was demonstrated by the
Awoyemijudgment.83 Mr. Awoyemi, a Nigerian national, drove in
Belgium with a driver's license issued by the United Kingdom.
When prosecuted by the Belgian authorities, he invoked his
rights under the Directive on the introduction of a European
driver's license. Mr. Awoyemi had not converted his British
driver's license within the then-applicable term of one year.
Under Belgian law this omission was equivalent to driving with-
out a license and Mr. Awoyemi was fined. The Court held that
Mr. Awoyemi fell within the scope ratione personae of the Direc-
tive. Mr. Awoyemi could not, however, invoke the protection,
developed by the ECJ in its case law for EU citizens, against the
sanction instituted by the Belgian authorities for his failure to
convert his British driver's license into a Belgian one. This pro-
tection was connected to the protection of the free movement of
persons guaranteed by the Treaty, which could not be invoked
by Mr. Awoyemi, a third country national.
An important question is whether the Court will continue to
follow this case law of Awoyemi in the future or whether the re-
cent Community rules concerning third country nationals will
inspire it to rule that third country nationals also fall within the
scope of the Treaty and can thus invoke the general principles of
Community law.
To answer this question we must analyze the rules that are
relevant to third country nationals. There are three situations in
which third country nationals may derive rights from EC law.
The special legislation on stateless persons, asylum seekers and
refugees-however important-will not be considered here.
83. See generally Criminal Proceedings against Ibiyinka Awoyemi, Case C-230/97,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-6781, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 15.
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First, EC law offers protection to third country nationals
who qualify as family members of EU citizens. This follows from
the ECJ's case law and secondary legislation. Directive 2004/38
confers on these persons equal rights of travel and residence,
although these rights partially depend on their status as family
members of an EU citizen. 84 Article 3(2) of the Directive further
awards a soft right to other family members and partners of the
EU citizen with whom he or she has an adequately proven lasting
relationship.
Second, third country nationals can derive rights from the
agreements their home States have concluded with the EC. This
follows from the case law of the ECJ in judgments like Jany as
well as various judgments concerning the association agreements
with Turkey and Morocco. 5
Finally, third country nationals may derive rights of travel
and residence from Directive 2003/86 on the right to family
reunification and Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of
third country nationals who are long-term residents.8 6
Hereafter the legal protection offered by EC law to each cat-
egory is discussed. Occasionally these categories overlap: the
Turkish partner of a German residing long-term in the Nether-
lands falls in all three categories.
B. Rights Based on Family Ties with EU Citizens
Carefree enjoyment of the rights of free movement by EU
subjects requires that their family members, too, enjoy some de-
gree of protection under EC law. This was already recognized in
Regulation 1612/68, which granted certain rights to family
members of workers.8 7 Family members can travel with the EU
citizen and have the right to seek work in the other Member
State. Directive 2004/38 also grants such rights to family mem-
bers of migrating EU citizens, regardless of their nationality.
The equal treatment provision (Article 24) explicitly stipulates
that the third country national with family ties to an EU citizen
has the same right to equal treatment as EU subjects. EC law
84. See Council Directive No. 2004/38, O.J. L 158/77, arts. 12-13 (2004).
85. SeegenerallyJany et al. v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, C-268/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-
8615, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
86. See Council Directive No. 2003/86, OJ. L 252/12 (2003); see also Council Di-
rective No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44 (2004).
87. See generally Commission Regulation No. 1612/68, O.J. L 257/2 (1968).
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also grants admission and residence to family members of EU
subjects who, after having exercised economic activities in an-
other Member States, return to the Member State of origin.8 ,
This is subject to the condition that the third country national
resided lawfully with the EU subject in the other Member
State.89
It is not always necessary for family members of EU citizens
to rely upon secondary legislation in order to enjoy the protec-
tion of Community law: this protection follows directly from the
treaty provisions. A far-reaching application of this principle is
found in Carpenter.9" In this judgment the Court held that the
deportation of Ms. Carpenter, a Philippine woman, was incom-
patible with the rules on free movement of services because she
would no longer be able to take care of the children of Mr. Car-
penter, a British citizen who was the service provider. Even
though restrictions to the free movement could in principle be
justified, deportation of Ms. Carpenter was contrary to the stan-
dards contained in the European Human Rights Convention
and therefore unacceptable from a Community law perspective.
Compared to the ruling in Carpenter, Chen goes a step fur-
ther. In Chen, the Court ruled that it follows from Article 18 EC
that a Chinese mother has the right to reside in the United King-
dom with her Irish baby: for the baby to enjoy the right of resi-
dence in the United Kingdom, it was necessary for her mother to
stay with her.91
Although a little exotic, Carpenter and Chen show how far EU
law protects family members of EU citizens regardless of their
nationality. Since these rights are based on family ties with an
EU citizen, two important restrictions apply. First, in order to
rely on EC law the family member must be able to invoke one of
the basic freedoms of the Treaty.9 2 This does not suffice: Akrich
shows that reliance on the freedoms is not allowed if the third
country national resided unlawfully in one of the Member
88. See Queen v. Immigration Tribunal et Singh, ex parte Sec'y of State for Home
Dep't, Case C-370/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4265, 4293-94, 11 17, 21.
89. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Akrich, Case C-109/01, [2003] E.C.R.
1-9607, 45.
90. See Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-60/00, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6279, 1-6319-20, 36-38, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 64, 1541, 1571.
91. See Chen, Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-9925, 47, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 48,
1090.
92. See Carpenter, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6320, 1 38, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 64, 1571.
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States.9" Second, the third country national forfeits the protec-
tion conferred by EC law if the family ties with the EU citizen
cease to exist, for instance due to divorce or the death of the EU
citizen. For these reasons, the protection of the EC rights dis-
cussed in the paragraphs below remains relevant for third coun-
try nationals with family ties to EU citizens.
C. Rights Under Agreements Concluded Between the EC and
Third Countries
The EC has concluded agreements with several countries
that contain provisions on the free movement of workers, ser-
vices and the freedom of establishment. These agreements do
not contain identical rules on free movement. The agreement
with Morocco, for instance, contains a non-discrimination provi-
sion, but not a provision on the free movement of employees.94
According to established case law such provisions should
not automatically be interpreted like the freedoms contained in
the EC Treaty. If, however, the agreement has the objective to
gradually establish free movement between the Union and the
third country in question, this would be a reason to apply the
principles contained in the EC Treaty as much as possible to sub-
jects of the third country in question. Thus, when interpreting
the terms and rights under the association agreement with Tur-
key, the ECJ regularly refers to its case law on the freedoms con-
tained in the EC Treaty.
For the purpose of this Article, however, it is not necessary
to extensively study the nature and contents of the free move-
ment provisions in all agreements concluded by the EC with
third countries. It is, however, important to note that those
agreements remain relevant when they provide protection be-
yond the Directives discussed below.
D. Rights Under Directives 2003/86 and 2003/109
In Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third coun-
try nationals who are long-term residents, the conditions for and
consequences of granting long-term resident status to third
93. See Akrich, [2003] E.C.R. 1-9607, 1 54.
94. See EI-Yassini v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, Case C-416/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-
1209, 1-1245, 56, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 32, 46.
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country nationals have been laid down."5 The residence permit
provided for by the Directive closely resembles what is known as
a "green card" in the United States. After five years of perma-
nent and uninterrupted residence in an EU Member State, third
country nationals may submit a request to obtain long-term resi-
dent status, provided that they have a fixed and regular income
and health insurance. The Member States may set integration
requirements as well. The requirement of a five-year legal and
uninterrupted stay means that a third country national who
leaves for another EU Member State for the purpose of continu-
ing his activities there will lose the rights accrued in the first
Member State and the required five-year term will start to run
again. Clearly, the free movement right of third country nation-
als is only complete once long-term residence status has been
acquired. Whereas an EU citizen has full free movement rights
as a result of migration, the third country national loses the pro-
tection of EC law as a result of migration.
The Directive introduces a new type of residence permit:
The EC residence permit for long-term residents. The Directive
includes the rights that long-term residents enjoy in the Member
State of residence (equal treatment, protection against removal),
as well as the right to stay in other EU Member States. Chapter
III provides for the right of long-term residents to stay in other
EU Member States for a period in excess of three months.96 For
this purpose, the third country national must apply for a resi-
dence permit with the competent authorities of the second
Member State. An important question is, of course, whether a
residence permit has a constitutive or a declaratory nature. As
the right of residence in a second Member State applies under
Article 14 "provided that the conditions set forth in this Chapter
are met," a residence permit appears to be a condition required
for obtaining a third country national's right of residence. In
this respect, an important difference in comparison with rela-
tives of EU citizens remains, as the right of residence of family
95. See Council Directive No. 2003/109, 0.J. L 16/44 (2004).
96. See id. art. 14, O.J. L 16/44, at 50 (2004). Legislation with regard to residence
periods of shorter than three months is being prepared. See Proposal for a Council
Directive, 0.J. C 270E/244 (2001) (relating to conditions in which third country na-
tionals shall have freedom to travel in territory of Member States for periods not ex-
ceeding three months, and introducing specific travel authorization and conditions of
entry or movement for periods not exceeding six months).
2006]
772 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:747
members of migrating EU citizens follows directly from the EC
Treaty.
Under Directive 2003/109, third country nationals have a
right of residence and the rights connected therewith that
closely resemble the rights of migrating EU citizens under the
EC law.97  Nevertheless, the differences remain substantial.
Under Article 11 of the Directive, long-term residents shall enjoy
equal treatment with nationals. Even though the equal treat-
ment provided for in Article 11(1) of the Directive covers the
economically important areas, this is not a general equal treat-
ment right. Moreover, Article 11(2) and (3) offer the Member
States a possibility of further restricting the right to equal treat-
ment in these fields. For example, the Member States are al-
lowed to put restrictions on the access to work as an employee or
a self-employed person if, under existing national or Community
legislation, these activities are reserved for their own nationals,
EU citizens or EEA citizens. The Member States may also set
language requirements with respect to access to education or
training.
Directive 2003/86 lays down the conditions under which
third country nationals lawfully staying in the Union qualify for
reunion with their family members staying outside the Union.9 8
The Directive has a long and laborious drafting history. It is still
controversial: the European Parliament ("EP") has lodged an
appeal against it.99 According to the EP, the Directive violates,
among other things, Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("ECHR").
The Directive applies to nationals from third countries who
lawfully stay in a Member State and have a prospect of a perma-
nent right to stay there. Article 4 provides for a list of family
members that qualify for family reunification (for more details
on this subject see Part IV.B. below). Chapter IV sets forth fur-
ther requirements for exercising the right of family reunifica-
97. See Council Directive No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44 (2004).
98. See Council Directive No. 2003/86, OJ. L 251/12, at 15 (2003).
99. See Action brought on 22 December 2003 by the European Parliament against
the Council of the European Union, Case C-540/03, O.J. C 47/35 (2004). On Septem-
ber 8, 2005, Advocate General Kokott delivered her Opinion in this case. She partly
agrees with the views of the European Parliament ("EP"), but nevertheless suggests that
declaring the appeal inadmissible as a partial annulment of the Directive-as the EP
seeks to do-is not possible.
HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION
tion. For example, the Member States may reject an application
for family reunification on grounds of public policy, public se-
curity or public health (Article 6). Article 7 offers the Member
States the possibility of demanding that the person applying for
family reunification must have adequate housing, health insur-
ance and income. The Member States may also set integration
requirements.
E. Conclusion
First, third country nationals enjoy the rights awarded to
them by Directive 2003/109.00 This Directive has a surplus
value also for the family members of EU subjects: the Directive
confers on them an independent right of travel and residence
and they are no longer dependent on their European partner.
The family ties with a migrating EU citizen still remain impor-
tant, however, because those ties give rise to more favorable
rights than those granted to third country nationals by Directive
2003/109. For instance, Directive 2003/109 does not give a
third country national not having the status of long-term resi-
dent in a Member State the right to travel to another Member
State in search of employment. If his partner is a migrating EU
citizen, primary EC law gives her or him that right. Further-
more, the third country national with family ties with a EU citi-
zen has the same equal treatment right as EU subjects. This
right has been incorporated explicitly into Article 24(1) of Di-
rective 2004/38.01 This does not apply automatically to all third
country nationals.
A similar conclusion applies to third country nationals who
derive rights from an agreement concluded by their country of
origin with the EC. The rights that Directive 2003/109 grants
are not derived from these agreements (such as the long-term
residence status); on the other hand, the agreement may give
more extensive protection than Directive 2003/109.
On a final note, a question that is extremely relevant to this
Article's topic is whether third country nationals only have the
rights specifically mentioned in the Directive, or whether the
coming into force of those Directives changes the status of third
country nationals to such an extent that they can henceforth rely
100. See generally Council Directive No. 2003/109, 0.J. L 16/44 (2004).
101. See Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 24(1), 0.J. L 158/77, at 112 (2004).
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on important general equal treatment principles accompanying
the free movement of persons rules that have been developed by
the ECJ, as discussed above. Third country nationals with family
ties to migrating EU citizens have such rights; to them, the equal
treatment principle as laid down in Article 12 EC applies in full.
But what about other third country nationals who fall within the
scope of the Directives? Do they thus fall within the scope the
EC Treaty, so that they can rely on Article 12 EC? A first consid-
eration of the objectives of the Directives points in that direc-
tion. Reference can be made in particular to paragraph 2 of the
preamble to Directive 2003/109, which states that the Directive
purports to lay down "a set of uniform rights which are as near as
possible to those enjoyed by citizens of the European Union. '"102
However, as noted above, Article 11 of Directive 2003/109 lays
down a specific equal treatment rule. Although Article 11
awards several important rights, there may be situations that are
not covered by this Article: the judgments given in Cowan'13 and
Pusa °4 are good examples. Cowan concerned entitlement to the
French fund for victims of crimes, and Pusa related to the dis-
criminatory application of Finnish tax laws. We would welcome
protection under Article 12 EC for similarly-situated third coun-
try nationals who are long-term residents.
And what about the possibility for a third country national
to rely on the protection against restrictions that EU citizens en-
joy under the free movement of persons rules? Could, for exam-
ple, a third country national with a long-term residence status in
Belgium rely on Community law to oblige the Belgian authori-
ties to recognize his German architect's degree, if this degree is
not listed in the architects' Directive? In other words, does the
bifurcation of rights under Awoyemi, as discussed above, still ap-
ply?
It could be argued that, in view of the special nature of the
free movement provisions under the Treaty, the provisions pro-
tecting third country nationals provide for a less extensive form
of integration and hence a more restrictive interpretation would
be justified. In our view, however, this is contradicted by the
102. Council Directive No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44, pmbl. 1 2 (2004). Considera-
tion 3 in the preamble to Directive 2003/86 uses similar terms.
103. Cowan v. Tresnor Public, Case C-186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 195.
104. Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskindinen Vakuutusyhtiti, Case C-224/02, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-5763.
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objectives of the Directives referred to earlier, which explicitly
declare that these rights should be "as near as possible to those
enjoyed by citizens of the European Union."1 °5 We therefore
hold the opinion that Article 12 EC can be invoked also by third
country nationals with a long-term residence status save for justi-
fied restrictions. Articles 2, 3, and 11 of Directive 2003/109 list a
number of such justification grounds.
IV. THE HARMONIZATION METHODS CONTAINED IN
THE DIRECTIVES
The preceding text focused on the rights derived from EC
law by EU citizens and third country nationals. This Part dis-
cusses the harmonization rules on migrating EU citizens and
third country nationals from the perspective of the harmoniza-
tion methods used. Our main focus is on the question of to what
extent the Directives allow the Member States to adopt rules dif-
ferent from those set by the Directives.
A. Migrating EU Citizens
Article 37 of Directive 2004/38 allows Member States to
adopt or maintain more favorable national provisions.106 In
other words, the Directive provides for minimum harmoniza-
tion. The qualification of persons as family members within the
meaning of the Directive is primarily determined by national
law. Article 2, point 2 of the Directive defines a family member
as follows:
a) the spouse;
b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a
registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a
Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State
treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage
and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the
relevant legislation of the host Member State;
c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are
dependants and those of the spouse or partner as defined
in point (b);
d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and
105. Council Directive No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44, pmbl. 2 (2004).
106. Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 37, OJ. L 158/77, at 121 (2004).
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those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b).l° 7
Important of course is the reference under (b) to the legislation
of the host Member State in determining whether the partner of
the EU citizen should be regarded as a family member as de-
fined in the Directive. The Directive does not contain a so-called
free movement clause. Registered partnership therefore only of-
fers rights of travel and residence in the Member State of long-
term residence and the other Member States where such part-
nership is recognized. In that respect, Article 2 paragraph 2 cod-
ifies ECJ case law regarding the right of residence of the partner
of a migrating EU citizen.108
The Directive does not contain a reference to the national
laws of the Member States for the definition of the spouse.
Therefore, the question arises as to how to interpret the term
"spouse." Dutch law allows same-gender marriages, which makes
the two partners spouses. The crucial question of course is
whether this should be recognized by EU Member States who do
not allow same gender marriages. For now, there is no clear an-
swer to this question. In D. v. Council, both the Court of First
Instance and the ECJ held that the concept of marriage should
be determined at the Community level.1" 9 However, this case
concerned the right to a family allowance for an official of the
Council with a registered partnership based on the Staff Regula-
tions. The Staff Regulations entitled married officials to a family
allowance. The question was whether the Court would adopt the
same approach with regard to the recognition by the host Mem-
ber State of a same-gender marriage consummated in another
Member State. On one hand, reference could be made to the
Court's case law on the term "worker," where the Court ruled
that this is a concept of Community law and thus prevents a strict
interpretation under national law frustrating the free movement
of employees. On the other hand, it is clear that when interpret-
ing the term "spouse" as referred to in Article 2(2) (a) of the
Directive, the Court should consider national traditions that are
difficult to reconcile. Because very divergent national traditions
exist, the Commission refrained from extending the term spouse
107. Id. art. 2(2), at 88.
108. See, e.g., Netherlands v. Reed, Case 59/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1283, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 448.
109. See D. v. Council, Joined Cases C-122/99 & C-125/99 [2001] E.C.R. 1-4319,
[2003] 3 C.M.L.R. 9; see also Case T-264/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-1.
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and partner as suggested by the European Parliament. In the
proposal the Commission argued:
On this point the Commission feels that harmonization of the
conditions of residence for Union citizens in Member States
of which they are not nationals must not result in the imposi-
tion on certain Member States of amendments to family law
legislation, an area which does not fall within the Commu-
nity's legislative jurisdiction. The Commission feels that the
amended proposal represents an equitable solution to these
issues: firstly, it complies with the principle of non-discrimina-
tion in as much as it requires Member States to treat couples
from other Member States in the same way as its own nation-
als; and, secondly, it allows for a possible change in interpre-
tation in the light of developments in family law in the Mem-
ber States. 1 °
This, however, does not answer the question of how to interpret
the term "spouse" as referred to in Article 2 (2) (a) of the Direc-
tive. As the majority of EU Member States do not recognize a
same-gender marriage, the Court is likely to interpret the term
"spouse" strictly, i.e., traditionally. This would mean that gay
and lesbian spouses would not derive any protection from the
Directive. Such an interpretation would probably not be con-
trary to the interpretation given to Article 8 of the European
Court of Human Rights Convention (family life). In Kerkhoven,
the Commission ruled that "despite the modern evolution to-
wards homosexuality, a stable homosexual relationship between
two women does not fall within the scope of the right to respect
for family life ensured by Article 8." '
A second option is to define the term "spouse" based on
either the law of the Member State where the marriage was con-
cluded or of the host Member State. It is clear that only in the
former case would the Directive result in the mutual recognition
of marriages. The discussion about the interpretation of the
term "spouse"-at any rate where the right of residence in an-
other EU Member State is concerned-is of particular relevance
110. Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, at 4, 3(1), COM (2003) 199
final (Apr. 15, 2003).
111. Kerkhoven, Hinke & Hinke v. The Netherlands, App. No. 15666/89, Eur.
Comm'n H.R. (1992) (unreported).
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for spouses who do not have the nationality of an EU Member
State and for that reason cannot invoke the free movement prin-
ciples. But partners who both have the nationality of an EU
Member State may want to rely on the Directive, for instance, for
their pension rights.
Article 3(2), clearly shows that the Directive also offers some
degree of protection to family members and partners who do
not fall within the scope of Article 2:
Without prejudice to any right to free movement and resi-
dence the persons concerned may have in their own right,
the host Member State shall, in accordance with its national
legislation, facilitate entry and residence for the following
persons:
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their national-
ity, not falling under the definition in point 2 of Article 2
who, in the country from which they have come, are
dependants or members of the household of the Union
citizen having the primary right of residence, or where
serious health grounds strictly require the personal care
of the family member by the Union citizen;
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable
relationship, duly attested.
The host Member State shall undertake an extensive exami-
nation of the personal circumstances and shall justify any de-
nial of entry or residence to these people.11 2
The obligation, in the last section of Article 3(2), to examine the
personal situation of the persons concerned, creates in our view
a presumption that the host Member State admits such partners.
Refusal has to be justified. In addition to the statements made
earlier about the rights of same gender spouses, it follows at any
rate from the Directive that same gender spouses may not be
categorically denied admission or residence.
Finally, the question arises as to the meaning of the phrase
"in accordance with its national legislation" in the heading ofthis provision.113 The phrase seems to refer to the national ad-
ministrative provisions implementing the Directive and should
not be interpreted as a possibility to affect the basic rights of the
Directive under national law.
112. Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 3(2), OJ. L 158/77, at 89 (2004).
113. See id.
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B. Migrating Third Country Nationals
The Family Reunification Directive expressly provides for
the possibility for Member States to adopt or maintain more
favorable provisions."4 According to Article 4(1) the following
persons qualify for family reunification: the sponsor's spouse,
the minor children of the sponsor and/or his spouse, the minor
children of the sponsor, and the minor children of the sponsor's
spouse."' Member States may extend the right to family reunifi-
cation to include: financially dependent relatives by blood in
the ascending line and adult children,1 6 and the unmarried
partner or a partner who is bound to the sponsor by a registered
partnership. It follows from the preamble that Member States
who do not recognize those family ties need not treat those per-
sons as family members "with regard to the right to reside in
another Member State, as defined by the relevant EC legisla-
tion." '117 "Relevant EC legislation" in the first instance includes
Directive 2003/109, which regulates the right of residence in
one of the other Member States in Articles 14 et seq.118
As was discussed in Part V.A. above, Article 37 of Directive
2003/109 provides that Member States may issue permits with a
permanent or unlimited validity under more favorable condi-
tions. In that case the permit does not entitle the bearer to a
right of residence in other Member States. The long-term resi-
dent may rely on full application of rights derived from the Di-
rective by long-term residents against the Member State where
he resides.
It follows from Article 3 that the Directive shall apply with-
out prejudice to existing international obligations on the treat-
ment of third country nationals. 19
Directive 2003/109 also contains provisions enabling the
Member States to set further conditions and limitations for ac-
114. Council Directive No. 2003/86, art. 3(2) OJ. L 251/12, at 14 (2003).
115. See id. art. 4(1), at 14.
116. See id. art. 4(3), at 14.
117. Id. at 12.
118. See Council Directive No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44, at 50-53 (2004).
119. Reference is made to bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded by the
Community or the Community and its Member States, bilateral agreements concluded
between a Member State and a third country before the date of entry into force of the
Directive, the European Convention on Establishment, the European Social Charter,
and the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers.
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quiring long-term resident status. 120 Directive 2003/86 allows
Member States similar freedom for the award of the right to fam-
ily reunification. 121 Directive 2003/109 explicitly allows Member
States to impose integration conditions for the award of long-
term residence status. Examples of such conditions under the
Family Reunification Directive are the requirements set out in
consideration 7 regarding housing, sickness insurance and in-
come. 1
22
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that Direc-
tive 2004/83 also includes provisions on minimum harmoniza-
tion. 123 Article 3 confers on Member States the right to intro-
duce or retain more favorable standards for determining who
qualifies as a refugee. This Directive only regulates the recogni-
tion of the status of refugees and the rights that the refugee has
within the Member State concerned. The Directive does not
award any rights of travel or residence that have been laid down
in the Directives discussed earlier.
V. TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW
A. Minimum Harmonization and Mutual Recognition
The Directives considered in this Article are all examples of
minimum harmonization. Harmonization of rules for the inter-
nal market embodying minimum harmonization is often com-
bined with a free movement clause. Such a clause obliges Mem-
ber States who have set higher national requirements to admit
products from other Member States that comply with the mini-
mum standard of the Directive. If the Netherlands, for instance,
decides to introduce stringent requirements for the nicotine
content of cigarettes, it may not impose those strict require-
ments on cigarettes produced in other EU Member States that
comply with the standard contained in the relevant directive.
In the harmonization rules for migrating EU citizens and
third country nationals, free movement clauses are absent. This
120. See Council Directive No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44, at 47 (2004).
121. See generally Council Directive No. 2003/86, O.J. L 251/12 (2003).
122. See Council Directive No. 2003/109, O.J. L 16/44, at 16-17 (2004).
123. See Council Directive No. 2004/83, O.J. L 304/12, at 12 (2004) (on minimum
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons
as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content
of the protection granted).
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absence can partly be explained by the difference between the
harmonization of laws for products and for persons. When
product laws are harmonized, the requirements for the products
will be harmonized. Any stricter requirements that a Member
State wishes to impose will restrict trade and there will be reason
to safeguard the free movement of the products that comply
with the requirements set by the Directive. When laws for per-
sons are harmonized, the Directive does not lay down specific
requirements for persons but confers certain rights on those per-
sons. When a Member State provides for more extensive protec-
tion, this will not restrain free movement, so there will be no
need for a free movement clause.
This is different for the provisions that define the scope ra-
tione personae of the Directives. The Directives give the core fam-
ily the benefit of free movement; the Member States may decide
to grant a more extensive protection but the other Member
States are under no obligation to accept such an extension. If,
for example, the Netherlands would allow family reunification
for unmarried partners, the Directive concerned would not re-
quire another Member State to recognize this if the third coun-
try national wished to settle there with his or her partner. As we
noted in IV.A., the Commission argued that the Community
lacks the necessary powers for harmonization in the field of fam-
ily law. As a result, the Member States cannot be forced to ac-
cept a more liberal granting of rights in other Member States.
We think that this argument is not very convincing. While it is
true that the Community does not have the competence to take
harmonization measures in the area of public health (Article
152, paragraph 4 of the EC Treaty), that does not mean that the
Community cannot adopt harmonization measures for the inter-
nal market that have an effect on public health.1 2 4 Of course,
the real reason is that the opinions of the Member States on
marriage and registered partnership differ considerably and that
mutual recognition is still a bridge too far.
B. Framework of Review for More Extensive National Measures
In the case of minimum harmonization rules for the inter-
124. See generally Sec'y of State for Health v. British American Tobacco (Inv.) Ltd.
and Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Case C-491/01, [20021 E.C.R. 1-11453, [2003] 1 C.M.L.R.
14.
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nal market, more stringent national measures should be compat-
ible with the relevant Treaty provisions. For the Directives de-
scribed in this Article, a similar test is not available. After all, if
the Member States grant a more extensive protection, it is in the
interest of the EU citizen or third country national. Other Mem-
ber States are only affected if the persons benefiting from such
extensive rights travel to those Member States. This is different
for internal market rules where economic operators may face
trade barriers as a result of more extensive national measures
(such as stricter environmental requirements).
C. Framework for Review for Less Extensive Protection by
Member States
The Directives, discussed in this Article, do offer the Mem-
ber States the possibility to set stricter requirements on certain
topics or to offer less extensive protection. We have mentioned
several examples above, to which Article 9(2) of Directive 2003/
86 could be added. 125 This provision allows Member States to
confine the right to family reunification of refugees to those ref-
ugees whose family ties existed before entry (Article 9(2) of Di-
rective 2003/86). This situation may be compared to stricter na-
tional standards in the case of minimum harmonization for the
internal market, so that a similar question about the framework
for review arises.
D. Relation Between Harmonization Legislation and the Framework
of the Treaty Law
When considering the harmonization rules on the free
movement of EU citizens, a comparison with the "internal mar-
ket" framework referred to in the introduction is obvious. For
example, in Dreessen II, the ECJ held that the obligation under
Article 43 EC to take all diplomas, certificates and other formal
qualifications as well as the relevant experience of the person
concerned (as earlier was determined in Vlassopoulou) into ac-
count, also applies if a Directive on the mutual recognition of
diplomas has been adopted for the profession in question.'2 6
The Court analyzed whether the Directive covered the issue ex-
125. See Council Directive No. 2003/86, art. 9, O.J. L 251/12, at 16, (2003).
126. See generally Conseil national de l'ordre des architectes v. Dreessen, Case C-
31/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-633, 25-26.
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haustively, taking an approach similar to its analysis in Doc-Morris
(which was related to the internal market). 127
Stricter national measures than provided for by Directive
2004/38 should also be evaluated against the EC Treaty. The
EC's interpretation of Article 18 EC has-as discussed in Part
II.E.-resulted in a more extensive protection of economically
inactive EU citizens and thus in the equalization of the protec-
tion that different categories of EU citizens have under EC law.
This seems to result in a general rule that national legislation
that differs from the standard set by the Directive should be
tested under Article 12 EC.
The secondary legislation for third country nationals as dis-
cussed in this Article reduces the existing discrepancy between
the protection for EU citizens and third country nationals. As a
result of this legislation, third country nationals now fall within
the scope of Community law and may therefore invoke Article 12
EC, on the conditions set out in Part III.E. A condition for the
successful reliance on Article 12, however, is that the subject
matter of the national measure falls within the scope ratione
materiae of EC law. For EU citizens this question has-as demon-
strated in Part II-become largely irrelevant. For third country
nationals, this remains an important question because not every
adverse treatment of third country nationals comes within the
scope of EC law.
The provisions in the Directives, and in particular the safe-
guard clauses, should be interpreted in line with the general
principles of Community law. This follows from Baumbast. Al-
though this judgment dealt with the free movement of EU citi-
zens in the context of Article 18 EC, these principles apply to all
cases that fall within the scope of the Treaty.
E. European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") as a
Minimum Standard
The ECHR"28 ultimately determines the minimum level of
protection within EC law both for EU citizens and third country
nationals. According to established ECJ case law, national or
community measures have to be compatible with the ECHR.
127. See supra note 17.
128. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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This requirement is confirmed in Article 6(2) of the EU
Treaty, 1 29 and has already been confirmed in cases like Carpenter.
National measures restricting free movement cannot be justified
if they violate the standards of the ECHR. The fact that the EU
requires the respect of the ECHR does not in itself yield addi-
tional protection against measures by Member States: after all,
all Member States as such are bound by the ECHR.
All European legislation should also be compatible with the
European Human Rights Convention. Thus the European Par-
liament in its appeal against Directive 2003/86 alleges a breach
of the ECHR. According to the Parliament, Article 4(1), last par-
agraph, Article 4(6), and Article 8 of the Directive violate Article
8 of the ECHR. For the purpose of this Article, it is important to
note that any stricter requirements imposed by the Member
States should also be compatible with the ECHR. When Mem-
ber States make use of the possibility offered by the Directive to
introduce stricter requirements, their action comes within the
scope of Community law. The ECJ may therefore review
whether the national measure is in conformity with the ECHR.
F. Public Policy, Public Security and Public Health Exception
The freedoms for EU subjects and third country nationals
are not unlimited. They may be restricted by Member States on
grounds of public policy, public security and public health. Ex-
ceptions to the Treaty freedoms can be found in Article 39
paragraphs 3 and 4 (workers), and Articles 45 and 46 of the EC
Treaty (services and establishment). Case law1" ° and secondary
legislation have further developed those exceptions.
The Court's interpretation of the Treaty exceptions is also
relevant to the exceptions to the free movement provisions con-
tained in the agreements concluded between the EC and third
countries. In Nazli the ECJ decided that the possibility offered
to the Member States to make exceptions to the rights of Turk-
ish subjects on grounds of public policy should be interpreted in
a way similar to the public policy exception contained in the EC
129. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6(2), O.J. C
325/5, at 11-12 (2002).
130. See, e.g., Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R 1337, [1974] 1
C.M.L.R. 1.
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Treaty. 3 t In Jany the Court reached a similar conclusion with
regard to the public policy exception in the agreements with the
Czech Republic and Poland.112  Of course, an important ques-
tion is whether the convergence in the case law on the different
free movement exceptions in the Treaty and those in the agree-
ments with third countries is continued in the harmonization
Directives.
The ECJ's interpretation of the exceptions to the free move-
ment of EU citizens has been codified and supplemented in Arti-
cles 27, 28, and 29 of Directive 2004/38.13 According to Article
27, Member States may restrict the freedom of movement and
residence of Union citizens and their family members, irrespec-
tive of nationality, on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health. The conditions applying the public policy or pub-
lic security exceptions in Directive 64/221 and developed in the
case law of the Court are found in Article 27(2). Article 28 con-
tains specific protection against expulsion and lists the factors to
be considered by Member States before taking an expulsion de-
cision on grounds of public policy or public security. Those fac-
tors are the duration of the residence on its territory of the indi-
vidual concerned, his/her age, state of health, family and eco-
nomic situation, social and cultural integration into the host
Member State and the extent of his/her links with the country of
origin. Citizens and their family members who have the right of
permanent residence may only be expelled on serious grounds of
public policy or public security. Union citizens who have resided
in the particular Member State for ten years or more and minors
are protected by an even higher standard: there should be im-
perative grounds of public security as defined by the Member
States.
Article 6 of Directive 2003/109 offers Member States the
possibility to refuse the long-term resident status on grounds of
public policy or public security.' The original Commission
proposal contained similar conditions as those applicable to the
free movement of EU citizens.135 The wording of the Directive
131. See generally Nazli v. Stadt Nfrnberg, Case C-340/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-957.
132. See generallyJany, C-268/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-8615, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
133. See Council Directive No. 2004/38, OJ. L 158/77, at 113-16 (2004).
134. Council Directive No. 2003/109, art. 6, O.J. L 16/44, at 47-48 (2004).
135. Article 7, paragraph 1, states, "[t]he Member States may refuse to grant the
status of long-term resident if the personal behavior of the person concerned repre-
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allows Member States more freedom. Article 6(1) merely lists
the factors to be considered by the Member State in question in
its decision-making: severity or type of the offence against public
policy or public security, or the danger that emanates from the
person concerned, while having proper regard to the duration
of the residence and to the existence of links with the country of
residence. According to Article 6(2), economic grounds may
not be considered. Article 6 of Directive 2003/86 contains a sim-
ilar specification of the Member States' powers to restrict the
right to family reunification. 13
6
The restrictive interpretation of the public policy and public
security exception of Article 28 of Directive 2004/38, however,
does apply if a Member State wishes to expel a long-term resi-
dent from its territory: this is only possible if she or he repre-
sents a present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or
public security (Article 12).
We regret that the rights of migrating third country nation-
als in the Directives differ from the public policy and public se-
curity exceptions applicable to EU citizens. The Member States
should have followed the basic philosophy, i.e., to stay, as much
as possible, close to the regime for EU citizens. This discrepancy
between the professed basic objective of the Directive and the
wording of the actual rules may also create legal uncertainty
about the significance of the exceptions. It may be up to the
Court to align the actual wording with the stated objective in the
preamble. In doing so, the ECJ will be, once again, on familiar
turf: It also gave a restrictive interpretation of the exceptions to
the freedoms in the EC Treaty.
The Court will also have to consider the significance of Arti-
cle 64 EC, which stipulates that Title IV of the Treaty does not
affect the Member States' responsibilities with regard to public
policy and public security. Does Article 64 constitute a general
exception that can be invoked by the Member States, even if in
this area harmonization legislation has been adopted? In our
opinion, the answer is negative. It can be assumed that Article
sents a present threat to public policy or public security." Article 7, paragraph 2, states,
"[t]he existence of criminal convictions does not in itself constitute a ground for the
refusal referred to in paragraph 1. This cannot be based on economic grounds."
136. Again, the original Commission proposal agreed with the interpretation given
to the exceptions to the rules for free movement of persons. See Proposal for a Council
Directive on the right to Family Reunification, COM (1999) 638 final (Jan. 12, 1999).
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64 is primarily relevant if the Directives based on Title IV do not
include safeguard clauses for public policy and public security.
If the Directives do include such clauses, as the Directives dis-
cussed here do, the Tedeschi case law should be applied accord-
ingly.137 In that case, the Directive determines whether national
measures are allowed and it is no longer possible to rely on Arti-
cle 64. Otherwise, the safeguard clauses contained in the Direc-
tives would lose their meaning.
But even in the improbable case that the Directive does not
provide for safeguard clauses, Article 64 does not give the Mem-
ber States a free hand to deviate from the standards set by the
Directives on grounds of public policy and public security.
When compared to Article 46 EC, Article 64 appears to leave the
Member States considerable latitude to take measures to protect
public policy or public security."3 8 Progressive harmonization of
the rules for third country nationals will make it desirable and
probable that in interpreting Article 64, the Court will be in-
spired by its case law on Article 46.
CONCLUSION
The relation between harmonization rules on migrating EU
citizens and third country nationals and the Treaty regime fol-
lows the same basic principles as the free movement of goods. If
harmonization rules-regulating a certain issue exhaustively-are
adopted, those rules constitute the relevant framework for re-
view. When the Directive allows the national legislation to adopt
more stringent or more lenient rules, such national legislation
should be compatible with the free movement rules of the
Treaty.
This does not mean, however, that the system for review is
the same as that for the free movement rules. There is, in the
case of harmonized rules for migrating EU citizens or third
country nationals, no Treaty provision similar to Article 95(4)
and (5) EC allowing Member States to adopt national measures
on grounds of major needs. Moreover, there are still major dis-
crepancies between the rules for EU citizens and those for third
137. See generally Tedeschi, Case 5/77, [1977] E.C.R. 1555, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
138. See L. Schmahl, in 1 KOMMENTAR ZUM VERTRAG tBER DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION
UND ZUR GRONDUNG DER EUROPA1SCHEN GEMEINSCHAYr 1863-66 (H. von der Groeben &
J. Schwarze, eds.).
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country nationals. The former are more harmonized than the
latter. The rules applicable to EU citizens are embedded in a
framework for review. By contrast, the rules for third country
nationals leave the Member States more scope for the adoption
of restrictive measures. Gradually, however, convergence be-
tween the two systems is taking place, which will inevitably re-
duce the Member States' powers.
The introduction of EU citizenship and the Court's inter-
pretation of Article 18 of the EC Treaty has resulted in a general
framework for review with a fundamental character for the bene-
fit of the EU citizens. The case law of the ECJ on EU citizenship
has extended both the scope ratione personae and the scope ra-
tione materiae of EC law and thus the right to equal treatment
contained in Article 12 EC. As a result, the debate shifts from
the question of when EU citizens can rely on Article 12, to the
question of which obligations for the Member States arise from
this Article. Which conditions-other than nationality criteria-
-may Member States set to grant access to certain facilities with-
out violating Article 12?
Many questions about the harmonization of the rules for
migrating third country nationals still remain unanswered. Be-
cause there is not yet a clear framework for review embedded in
the Treaty, the Court has little guidance when it has to interpret
national measures. In our view, when the ECJ is called upon to
interpret the regulations on migrating third country nationals, it
would be desirable and perhaps inevitable for the ECJ to follow
as much as possible the application of the principles governing
the free movement of EU citizens. This approach is desirable,
because it does justice to the basic principle of the Directives for
third country nationals-i.e., to give them rights that resemble
those of EU citizens as much as possible. It also does justice to
the objective of Title IV of the Treaty-i.e., to create an area of
freedom, security and justice. But it also seems inevitable that
the adoption of the Title IV Directives will result in a conver-
gence of the rights of third country nationals and EU citizens.
The existing principles governing the free movement of EU citi-
zens will inevitably guide the interpretation of questions result-
ing from new harmonization legislation. Those principles
should, of course, not be applied uncritically, but in our view
there seems to be a presumption that these principles apply to
this area as well and that not applying them requires justifica-
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tion. The recognition that the Directives bring third country na-
tionals within the scope of Community law and thus enable them
to rely on Article 12 EC could be an important step towards such
convergence.
